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Abstract 
 
A number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political 
knowledge on turnout. Both information acquisition and turnout, however, 
are likely to be determined by a similar set of variables, rendering hard the 
identification of a causal link in empirical investigations. Available 
empirical regularities should therefore be interpreted as mere correlations. I 
address this problem by using an instrumental variables approach, where the 
instruments are represented by various proxies of information supply on 
mass media. Using survey data from the 1997 British General Election 
Study, I show that political knowledge has a sizeable influence on the 
probability of voting and that mass media play an important role in 
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1 Introduction
In an idealized vision of democracy, public decisions are based on the preferences
and the opinions of all the members of a polity. It is therefore common in the public
debate to regard the extent of electoral participation as a measure of the quality
of democratic governance. Low turnout is sometimes seen as a symptom of little
attachment to public a¤airs and even to democracy itself and is therefore associated
with the danger of a self-referential political class. On the other hand, however,
high participation is not compelling evidence of healthy democratic governance,
and many de facto dictatorial systems show extremely high turnout rates. At the
same time, abstention could be interpreted as satisfaction rather than disinterest.
Understanding the determinants of turnout is central to this debate and can
provide a substantial insight on the quality of democratic governance and the pos-
sible steps to improve it. A central question is whether more and better political
information can increase votersparticipation. Uninformed participation is, after
all, not necessarily better than no participation at all.
Starting with the study of Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980), a vast empirical
literature consistently nds positive correlations between turnout and individual
characteristics such as income and education. This implies that "low voter turnout
means unequal and socioeconomically biased turnout" (Lijphart, 1997), and there-
fore participation levels can inuence public policy. Evidence in support of this has
been found by numerous scholars who have shown, for example, that social spend-
ing is positively a¤ected by aggregate turnout (Peterson and Rom,1989; Hicks
and Swank, 1992; Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Lindert, 1996; Stromberg, 2004), by
lower-class mobilization (Hill and Leighley, 1992, and Hill, Leighley and Hinton-
Andersson, 1995), and by the extension of the voting franchise1 (Husted and Kenny,
1997).
Recent formal models link information to voter participation (Matsusaka, 1995;
Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996; Ghirardato and Katz, 2002). There is, however,
little empirical evidence in support of these models. Available evidence that edu-
cation a¤ects turnout (Milligan et al., 2003) provide only indirect support. Some
studies are based on subjective assessments of knowledge (Sanders, 2001; Lassen,
2005). Direct measures of political knowledge show that better informed citizens
are more likely to vote (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Wattenberg et. al., 2000),
but this relationship has to be interpreted with caution. Political knowledge is not
1Besley and Case (2003), however, nd no evidence of an impact of turnout on the composition
of US state legislatures.
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an exogenous variable: the same motivation that leads to participation is likely
to drive information acquisition. Thus, the link between information and turnout
could be a spurious correlation driven by unobserved votersheterogeneity.
In this paper I address this issue by providing an instrumental variable esti-
mation of the e¤ect of information on turnout using data from the 1997 general
election in the United Kingdom. I conclude that, at least in the context analysed
here, political knowledge has a sizeable and statistically signicant impact on the
British citizens likelihood of voting. The instruments consist of proxies for the
supply of news on the British media: thus, I also conclude that mass media can
have an important indirect (i.e. via political knowledge) impact on participation.
2 Information and turnout
Politicians appear to struggle for the attention of mass media. Campaign strategies
tend to be heavily conditioned by access to media and spin doctors are increasingly
inuential. Political advertising and access to television are regulated in many
democratic countries during electoral campaigns. Either explicitly or implicitly,
these phenomena must be based on the presumption that information matters for
voting behaviour.
However, various arguments in support of the idea that information is "behav-
iour irrelevant" have been recently elaborated by Popkin (1991), Wittman (1995),
and Lupia and McCubbins (1998). Their main argument is that voters use heuris-
tics and manage to behave as if they were informed2. Also, using spatial models
of elections, a number of papers show that it is possible for imperfectly informed
voters to emulate the behaviour of the better informed ones when they receive
a credible signal from a source whose preferences are known (McKelvey and Or-
deshook, 1984; Calvert,1985; Sobel, 1985; Grofman & Norrander, 1990; Lupia,
1992). If party platforms tend to be consistently tied to the interests of specic so-
cioeconomic groups, then party identication or public endorsements can provide a
simple and e¤ective way to vote instrumentally. Bartels (1996), using the National
Election Study surveys conducted for six US presidential elections, nds instead
that uninformed voters do signicantly better than they would by chance, but sig-
2Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) dene heuristics as  judgmental shortcuts, e¢ cient
ways to organize and simplify political choices, e¢ cient in the double sense of requiring relatively
little information to execute, yet yielding dependable answers even to complex problems of choice
(p.19). Evidence on the use of heuristics is provided, among others, in McKelvey and Ordeshook
(1984), Brady and Sniderman (1985), and Lupia (1994).
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nicantly less than they would with complete information, despite the availability
of cues and shortcuts. For what concerns turnout, if information does not increase
the utility of casting a vote then it should also not a¤ect participation. This con-
clusion, however, is not supported by empirical research. Palfrey and Poole (1987),
for example, use ICPSR survey data from the 1980 presidential election in the US
to show that information is signicantly related to both political extremism and
turnout.
A number of formal models on information aggregation put forward the idea
that, in spite of its inuencing individual voting behaviour, political information
can be outcome irrelevant. In Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996 and 1999), non-
informed voters have an incentive to delegate their choice to the better informed
to increase the chances of an informed aggregate decision. Delegation takes place
via abstention, which increases the probability of any informed voter being pivotal.
This argument relies on the assumption that non-partizan voters share the same
objective function. Thus, in delegating their decision to other non-partizan voters,
the uninformed do not incur the risk of leaving the decision to people with di¤erent
tastes3.
Matsusaka (1995), presents a decision-theoretic model of the impact of infor-
mation on turnout based on the idea that better informed choices provide more
utility to Bayesian voters. Ghirardato and Katz (2002) show that non-Bayesian
"ambiguity-averse" voters are even more prone to abstain than Bayesian voters
when they receive poor quality information.
It seems fair to say that the evidence in support of such models is still limited:
in particular, despite a vast body of empirical research on the determinants of
turnout, we are still far from knowing whether there is any causal link between
political knowledge and participation. Education has often been found to have a
high inuence on turnout (Wolnger and Rosenstone, 1980; Matsusaka and Palda,
1999; Milligan et al., 2003)4. It is possible to rationalize this empirical regularity on
the ground that education reduces the costs of acquiring information. In empirical
terms, however, education and information can be correlated for a number of other
reasons, including the fact that formal education might increase socialization, sense
of e¢ cacy, and the identication with the general values of a society.
3Feddersen and Pesendorfers argument ts in the tradition of the so-called Condorcet-jury
theorem(Young, 1988, Austen-Smith, 1990, Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996), where the assump-
tion of common objective functions is clearly less problematic than in political elections.
4In Britain, however, such inuence has not been found to have high statistical signicance
(Denver, 2003).
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Sanders (2001) uses survey data from the 1996 US presidential election to
show the importance of perceived uncertainty about candidates for turnout5. Delli
Carpini and Keeter (1996) go one step further by using direct measures of political
knowledge from the 1988 NES Survey and showing that these are good explana-
tory variables of turnout. Wattenberg et al. (2000) show that voters who are more
informed about the US House are more likely to vote in the House elections. This
is, however, still one step short of showing that information determines turnout,
since political knowledge is an endogenous covariate.
To illustrate this endogeneity problem, suppose we want to estimate the e¤ect of
information on turnout and let us consider a simple model of instrumental voting.
In the classical formulation of Riker and Ordeshook (1968), a citizen votes if
PB +D > C (1)
where P is the probability to cast a decisive vote, B is the gain in policy bene-
t derived from the victory of the preferred candidate when compared with the
alternatives, D is the psychological benet of voting and C is the cost. Political
information helps the citizens to form a more precise idea about B6.
Assume now that there are only two candidates, that the policy space is uni-
dimensional and that B depends on the distance  between the two proposed
platforms. The optimal decision for the voter depends on the value of : We can
indicate with W () the maximum value function derived from the maximization of
U() = PB() +D   C with respect to the voting decision. Now suppose that 
is unknown and has to be estimated. If b is a more precise estimate than e of the
true , then we can say that the value of using b instead of e is given by
EW (b; )  EW (e; ) (2)
where E represents the expected value operator. If the cost of passing from es-
timate e to estimate b is c (for example to acquire more observations), then such
5In a very di¤erent context, Coupeand Noury (2004) show that, during a National Research
Council investigation, US academics who declared themselves more familiar with specic doctor-
ate programs were also more likely to express an evaluation on these programs.
6Other elements in (1) can be inuenced by information: for example the perception of P can
be a¤ected by the polls published during the electoral campaign. I focus on B, because it is the
element that reects the policy platforms and can, therefore, be related to political knowledge in
a strict sense.
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acquisition will take place if and only if
EW (b; )  EW (e; ) + b > c (3)
where, as in the voting equation (1), I add a personal benet b which represents
the non-instrumental enjoyment of political information, orthogonal to political
preferences. The problem in testing the e¤ect of information on turnout arises as
D and b are likely to be correlated, both being driven by some sense of civic duty
or pure enjoyment of politics. Finding a positive relation between information and
turnout could therefore just be the consequence of omitting relevant variables from
the empirical analysis.
To identify the e¤ect of information on turnout we need a theory of how politi-
cal knowledge is formed. Following Luskin (1990), we can say that voterslearning
of a particular subject depends on "the political information to which people are
exposed, their ability to assimilate and organize such information, and their mo-
tivation to do so". Of these determinants, only the rst appears to be genuinely
exogenous and therefore capable of providing instrumental variables to identify in-
formation e¤ects on turnout. Thus, in the turnout equation I instrument political
knowledge by using various measures of the information supply to which voters
have been exogenously exposed. As a by-product of this analysis we also get an
insight on the determinants of the political knowledge of British voters and on the
role of the media.
Two other papers provide empirical studies of the impact of information on
turnout and take into account the endogeneity problem. Stromberg (2004) provides
evidence of the impact of the di¤usion of radio on the distribution of New Deal
spending and nds that a part of this e¤ect can be explained by the fact that
radio fostered turnout: a 1% increase in the share of radio ownership in a county
increased the turnout rate by 0.12%. This is a very interesting nding but it is
based on aggregate data and therefore it cannot demonstrate that it was increased
political knowledge which determined increased turnout. Only the use of survey
data can address this issue in a direct fashion. Lassen (2005) uses survey data from
a referendum on decentralization held in the city of Copenhagen. Since four out of
fteen districts carried out a pilot project of decentralization before the referendum,
the voters living in such districts are assumed to have exogenously been exposed
to better information. Voters are assumed to be informed if they have an opinion
on decentralization, not informed otherwise. Lassen nds that information has a
5
sizeable and signicant impact on turnout.
In Lassen (2005), turnout is self-reported, which probably overestimates the
propensity to vote. For this reason I will use instead veried turnout data. Even
more importantly, Lassen uses a measure of political knowledge that, apart from
being extremely coarse, does not allow the observer to distinguish knowledge from
pure beliefs (which are not necessarily based on information). In terms of the
Feddersen and Pesendorfer model, for example, one would like to be able to dis-
tinguish not only the informed voters from the uninformed but also the partizan
(whose voting decision is not conditional on the state of the world) from the inde-
pendent. In the following I will show that people who have an opinion (in the form
of attachment to a party) are not necessarily better informed than others7.
Distinguishing between opinions and information has also clear normative im-
plications: a higher turnout rate may improve the quality of democratic decision-
making if it is driven by information. This is not necessarily the case if turnout is
fostered by uninformed beliefs. In this paper I use therefore an objective measure
of political knowledge and see how it a¤ects the propensity to vote.
Finally, this paper is also related to the recent experimental evidence on voter
mobilization by Gerber and Green (2000). They show that voter turnout is substan-
tially increased by non-partizan personal canvassing. One possible interpretation
of this result is that canvassing increases political awareness: at the very minimum,
people are reminded of the coming election. By showing that political knowledge
increases participation, this paper makes such interpretation quite plausible and,
at the same time, shows that voters can be mobilized by information provided by
the mass media.
7Lassen (2005) refers to a previous unpublished version of this paper and, correctly, points
out that a "key instrument, readership of quality newspapers, could be related to unobserved
heterogeneity". Overidentication tests support the use of that instrument, but such tests have




In equation (1) I dened a citizens net utility from voting as
U0 = PB +D   C: (4)
U0 is a latent (unobservable) variable and turnout T is a binary indicator such that





where X is a vector of characteristics of the individual and of the environment8
(including P ) and " is a white noise disturbance that includes the non-instrumental
benet D9. We can then say that
Pr[T = 1jX] = Pr[" <  0X] = F( 0X) (6)
Assuming F() is the standard normal distribution function, the (6) can be
estimated by maximum likelihood probit.
Let us now introduce political information (Info) and dene a new latent vari-
able U1 of the form
U1 = 1Info+ 
0
2X+ " (7)
We then have that
Pr[T = 1jInfo;X] = F(1Info+
0
2X): (8)
Estimating equation (8) is a correct procedure only if information acquisition
is orthogonal to turnout. In the model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), for
example, people are randomly informed or uninformed about the true state of the
world, and therefore this estimation would be appropriate. However, as discussed
in Section 2, information could be an endogenous explanatory variable in which
case the coe¢ cient estimates of (8) would be biased. To overcome this problem we
8This includes a vector of 1s, and therefore 
0
includes a constant term.
9Some imperfect indicators of the sense of civic duty and interest in politics can be included
in X. Such inclusion, however, does not change the results in any substantial way.
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U1 = 1Info+ 
0
2X+ u2 (10)
where T = 1 if U1 > 0; T = 0 if U1  0, and X is again a vector of covariates rep-
resenting individual and constituency characteristics which are assumed to a¤ect
both turnout and information acquisition. The identifying covariates are repre-
sented by the vector Z. These explanatory variables are assumed to a¤ect political
knowledge but not directly the turnout decision. If this is the structural model,
then simple probit estimates will clearly su¤er endogeneity bias as the two error
terms u1 and u2 are correlated. Thus, I use a two-step probit procedure. The rst
step consists of estimating the reduced form (9) by OLS and getting the residualsbu1. Our turnout equation will then be based on the following latent variable10:




3bu1 + u2 (11)
This procedure provides both consistent (though not e¢ cient) estimates of (1;

2);
as well as an endogeneity test to determine whether there is any overlap between
the set of unobservables a¤ecting equations (9) and (10). It consists of a simple
t-test for the signicance of the coe¢ cient 3: we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that Info is weakly exogenous in the turnout equation if 3 is insignicant.
The estimated standard errors from this method are not correct but Monte
Carlo evidence tend to show that the asymptotically correct standard errors are no
more e¤ective in large nite samples than the conditional standard errors (Bollen,
Guilkey and Mroz, 1995). Nevertheless, to overcome any potential problems, stan-
dard errors of relevant variables have been estimated by bootstrap (with 1000
repetitions).
Finally we need to check the validity of the instruments. This can be done in
several ways. One possibility is to compare a probit regression of turnout on all
exogenous variables and instruments (unrestricted model) with the same regression
where instruments are excluded but tted values from the rst stage regression are
included (restricted model). Ideally, we would like the two to be similar. We can
then perform a chi-square test based on the likelihood function. Another method,
10Dene Y = (X;Z) and consider the reduced form UR = Yi+v: Then indicating with 2 the
standard deviation of v; we have that the estimable structural equation is based on the variable
T  = B1=2: For further details see Maddala (1983).
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based on a Wald test, consists in checking the joint signicance of the instruments
in the turnout equation. If information is not included this is always a valid test.
If information is found to be exogenous then another method becomes available. I
illustrate this test in section 5, where results are presented.
4 The data
I use data from the 1997 general election in Great Britain11. The United Kingdom
is a parliamentary system in which members of parliament are elected one in each
electoral constituency using a rst past the post rule. Two major parties, Conser-
vative and Labour, compete to obtain a majority in the parliament, and therefore
control of the government. A number of other parties, however, present their can-
didates in most constituencies and some manage to win seats in parliament. In
particular, the Liberal-Democratic party is a well established national third force,
while, in Scotland and Wales, nationalist parties tend to win normally more seats
than the Conservatives. In 1997 the Labour party obtained a signicant victory
after four consecutive Conservative terms.
The main source of data used in this paper is the 1997 British General Elec-
tion Study (BES). This study collects data from face to face interviews that were
conducted shortly after the election, with approximately 90% of the eldwork com-
pleted within six weeks of the election date. The response rate was 62%, resulting
in an overall sample of 3615 voters. However, I have been forced to drop a number
of observations since some respondents refused to answer relevant questions (par-
ticularly about income). In most cases I use a sample of 2882 registered voters12.
A very important problem faced by studies on turnout is that most surveys
tend to overrepresent the turnout rate. This is essentially due to two reasons: rst,
people tend to declare that they voted even if they did not and, second, people that
participate in elections tend also to be more willing to take part in surveys. Our
dataset does not su¤er from the rst type of bias: turnout was veried by using the
electoral register. I rely on self-reported information only when veried turnout is
11This means England, Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland has a substantially di¤erent
political situation from the rest of the country and it is customarily surveyed separately.
12The qualifying date for electoral registration expired several months before the election day
(10th October 1996). We are interested in information acquisition and turnout of potential voters;
clearly the motivation to acquire information of non-registered voters is di¤erent. Thus, only
registered voters are considered here. This implies dropping a limited number of observations.
All estimations have been replicated including those observations and no relevant changes have
been noticed.
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not available. This is the case for 415 observations (or 14.4% of the sample), among
which the turnout rate (72.3%) is very close to the o¢ cial turnout rate for that
election (71.5%). As can be seen from Table 1, there are 109 respondents in the
sample that declared to have voted when in fact they did not and 18 voters that
declared to have not voted when in fact they did. This shows that using veried
turnout makes an important di¤erence.
The second type of bias, although much harder to avoid, appears to be limited.
Our sample displays an overall 78.2% turnout while o¢ cial turnout was 71.5%.
However, when the o¢ cial turnout is adjusted to take into account of the inaccu-
racies in the electoral register at the time of the election13 this gure raises to 74%
(Denver, 2003), so that the actual bias is just slightly above 4%.
A special feature of the 1997 BES is to include a higher number of voters from
ethnic minorities and Scotland. This makes the use of the population weights ab-
solutely crucial if we want the sample to be representative of the British citizenry14.
Unweighted regressions (not reported) tend however to deliver similar results.
The starting point of this analysis is to measure political knowledge. Clearly,
the range of issues and facts that are relevant to politics is extremely large, so how
can we gauge political knowledge? What is relevant and what is not? Is there
any risk to bias the assessment with our priors? Delli Carpini & Keeter (1996),
in presenting evidence on the political knowledge of American voters, based their
analysis on nearly 3700 questions collected in various surveys. They concluded that
researchers developing national or general political knowledge scales need not be
overly concerned with the mix of specic topics covered by individual items. Scales
made up of items tapping only knowledge of institutions and processes, substantive
issues, or public gures are likely to serve as reasonable measures of the overarching
construct15. This is extremely important in this case: the empirical analysis I
present is based on a limited set of questions but correct answers to such questions
are likely to be correlated with the knowledge of other political issues.
The 1997 BES is well suited for the purpose of this study because it contains
two sets of questions which help to establish how much respondents know about
British politics. In the rst set of questions respondents were asked to write down
as many candidatesnames in their constituency as they could remember (with a
13The electoral register is compiled several months before the election. The o¢ cial turnout rate
refers to the population on the register and is therefore not totally accurate.
14As usual, these weights also take into account of the di¤erent selection probabilities and rates
of response.
15Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), p.174.
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maximum of six). The answers have then been reconciled with the actual list of
candidates. In the second set of questions, respondents received seven statements
on the British political and institutional system and were asked to say if these
were true or false16. To measure political knowledge I give a point for each correct
answer in the rst set of questions and a score of 0.66 for each correct answer in
the second set of questions17. I then add the scores each respondent obtains to
form a variable (Info) that I use as a measure of political knowledge. A kernel
estimate of Info is reported in Fig. 1, where the dashed line represents a normal
distribution with the same mean and variance of Info: it is evident that political
knowledge is approximately normally distributed.
The BES also includes questions on a number of economic and socio-demographic
individual characteristics that I use as control variables. I also use data from the
1991 Census to control for the possible inuence on turnout of the characteristics
of the local environment, like marginality, social norms etc18.
In general, I attempt to include all the variables that, for di¤erent reasons, have
been found to be relevant by the empirical literature on turnout19. For this reason
the list of variables employed in this study is long, and the standard errors are
often high because of multicollinearity. Nevertheless, this strategy leads to robust
results for what concerns the variables we are interested in.
One important issue concerns the use of political attitude variables, such as a
persons interest in politics, her attachment to a specic party and her ideological
self-placement on the left-right dimension. These variables have been found to be
important predictors of electoral turnout. Moreover, they can capture some of the
unobserved heterogeneity that drives both turnout and political knowledge, and
their inclusion in the turnout equation should limit the omitted variables problem.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to be cautious about their use. Answers to this
sort of questions can be an ex-post rationalization of voting behaviour. Moreover,
it has been shown that responses to this type of questions are sometimes sensitive
to the order in which the questions are posed20. This casts doubts on the overall
reliability of such indicators. Thus, I perform my analysis both with the political
16Statements are reported in the Data appendix.
17The di¤erent weight is derived by Bayes rule: see the Data appendix for details.
18Data from the Census are at the level of Districts, local administration units reported in the
BGES.
19See for example Matsusaka and Palda, (1999), and, for a study of the U.K, Swaddle and
Heath (1989).
20See for example Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber (1984) and Abramson, Silver, and An-
derson (1987).
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attitude variables and without. As an alternative I use other, imperfect but more
objective, indicators, like the awareness of being registered, the fact of reading a
quality morning newspaper regularly and whether the respondent voted or not in
the previous election. Results turn out not to be sensitive to the inclusion or not
of political disposition variables.
Finally, I now describe the instrumental variables, i.e. the vector Z in equa-
tion (9). I use three variables that I consider to inuence information acquisition
but not directly turnout. The rst instrument is represented by a dummy vari-
able (bigshot) equal to 1 when a nationally famous politician is candidate in the
constituency. I dene as big shots all the current and past members of cabinet,
the members of the Labour shadow-cabinet21 and the leader of the third major
party (Liberal Democratic), Paddy Ashdown. I assume that these politicians are
better known by the public than all the other candidates. Therefore, voters from
those electoral constituencies should have better information on candidates. The
second instrument (Salience) attempts to capture the salience on media of each
electoral constituency during the campaign. For this purpose I refer to the content
of three major national newspapers22 during the thirty days preceding the election.
Salience consists of a dummy equal to 1 if a constituency (or any of its candi-
dates) has received above average coverage in these newspapers but is not included
in bigshot. My assumption is that people living in more salient constituencies are
more exposed to political information and therefore, keeping other things equal,
will know more about candidates and platforms in the day of the election. The
third instrument is a dummy variable (bbc100) equal to 1 for citizens living in con-
stituencies that the BBC dened as "the battleground" and on which the BBC
decided to focus its attention on the night of the election: they were the expected
closest 100 Consevative-held constituencies (and therefore the decisive ones as in
1997 a swing against the Conservatives was expected). I expect these constituen-
cies to get larger media coverage during the electoral campaign and, possibly, a
more intense e¤ort by parties in making candidates and platforms known to the
public.
Data description and summary statistics are reported in the Data appendix.
21A shadow-cabinet is put in place by the main opposition party and is composed of those
who, in case of victory, are most likely to become members of the cabinet. A shadow foreign
secretary, for example, follows very closely the government foreign policy and is supposed to be
able to control, comment and propose alternatives to the foreign policy of the government. This
makes shadow-cabinet members quite popular on the media.
22The Times, The Guardian and The Independent.
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5 Results
To make this analysis comparable with previous studies of turnout, I start by esti-
mating a standard turnout equation. The results are reported in Table 2. Column
1 contains the results when income, education and church attendance are numer-
ical variables while in column 2 they are considered as categorical variables. A
comparison of the log-likelihood scores shows that I cannot accept the restriction
imposed under the rst specication and, therefore, in the subsequent analysis I
always consider income, education and church attendance as categorical dummies.
I nd that the propensity to vote increases with income, and is signicantly
larger for people who are married, who have been contacted by a canvasser23 and
who are aware of being on the electoral register. More surprisingly, I nd that a
number of individual variables like education, gender and age, are not signicant.
It should be noted, however, that columns 1 and 2 include past voting behaviour,
i.e. whether the respondent voted or not in the previous general election. This aims
at capturing relevant individual-specic unobservables and probably absorbs most
of the impact of other variables (whose parameters represent therefore variations
with respect to this individual xed e¤ect). Moreover, to capture unobservable
environmental characteristics I include aggregate turnout, which is also likely to
absorb the e¤ect of other constituency-level variables.
Column 3 presents a more parsimonious model where past voting behaviour and
aggregate turnout have been excluded. The resulting estimates have a decidedly
more familiar avour. Consistent with previous ndings on the determinants of
turnout in British elections (Crewe, Fox and Alt, 1977; Swaddle and Heath, 1989;
Denver 2003), my estimates show that income, marital status, housing tenure and
residential mobility are, together with the respondents age, very good predictors
of turnout, while education and gender seem to have little impact24. Column 4
includes political attitude variables which, not surprisingly, have a very strong
explanatory power. Thus, the data o¤er no major surprises. Before proceeding, it
is worth noting the negative impact of having a full time job on the propensity to
vote25 and the little impact of the constituency-level variables, even when aggregate
23If we separate face-to-face canvassing from telephone calls we nd that the rst is vastly more
e¤ective (not reported). This conrms what has been found by Gerber and Green (2000) for the
United States.
24Milligan et al. (2003) nd that the impact of education is especially strong on registration.
Conditional on being registered, this e¤ect disappears. It is therefore not surprising that education
tends to be insignicant in Britain, where compiling the register is the responsibility of local
authorities. Our sample contains, anyway, only registered voters.
25Thus, voting on a working day (Thursday) may have an impact on the decision to vote.
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turnout is not included.
Table 3 reports estimates of the turnout equation when information is included.
It is immediately clear that information is a strong predictor of turnout. Both the
magnitude and the signicance level of the coe¢ cient seem to suggest that informa-
tion is amongst the most important explanatory variables of electoral participation.
In the simple probit estimates of column 1, increasing information by one standard
deviation above the mean renders a voter approximately 6% more likely to partic-
ipate. This e¤ect is strong and robust to variations in the specication adopted. I
obtain very similar estimates whether or not I include the respondentsself assess-
ment of their political interest, ideological position and party attachment.
The two step probit also shows a positive impact of information on turnout.
Estimation is this time less precise26, but the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is much
larger. In this case increasing information by one standard deviation above the
mean raises the probability to vote by approximately 13%. Once again, introducing
disposition variables does not produce any relevant changes. Figure 2 reports the
probability of voting associated with the estimates of columns 1 and 3 in Table
327: the impact of information is dramatically stronger when I use the two-step
procedure.
Although it seems now beyond any doubt that political knowledge increases
turnout, if we want to quantify such impact, which estimates should we use? Look-
ing at the coe¢ cient of the rst stage residuals in columns 3 and 4, the null hy-
pothesis that information is weakly exogenous in the turnout equation cannot be
rejected. This result should be interpreted with some caution, as it is clear that
residuals, although not signicant at the 10% level, are still not totally unrelated
to turnout. More importantly, not rejecting exogeneity does not mean that there
are no variables driving both turnout and information. It means, however, that
including the standard controls used in studies of turnout, we can probably be re-
assured that there are no omitted variables left in the residuals that are correlated
with information. Controlling for past voting behaviour is, for example, important
to capture unobserved heterogeneity. Including political disposition variables is,
instead, not essential.
The instruments I use pass comfortably the overidentication tests presented in
the previous section and shown in Table 4. Twice the di¤erence between the log-
likelihood of the equations in the rst and the second columns (where, respectively,
26The signicance level is, however, still very close to 5%.
27Including disposition variables would change the graphic only marginally.
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the instrumental variables and the rst stage tted values are included) is equal
to 0.28 and a chi-test is easily passed. The corresponding statistic when I include
disposition variables is 0.19 and again a chi-test is passed. Table 4 also reports
the Wald tests for the exclusion of bigshot, bbc100 and salience from the turnout
equation (where information is not included): these deliver similar outcomes. To
these, we can add a further test if, like in this case, exogeneity cannot be rejected:
the validity of the instruments can be checked by including in the turnout equation
both information and the three instrumental variables. If instruments are valid
then this equation should be not too di¤erent from the restricted model when the
three instruments are excluded. The results (both a log-likelihood ratio and a
Wald test) are reported at the bottom of columns 3 and 6 for, respectively, the
equations with and without disposition variables. They also show that the three
instruments are not directly related to turnout. Hence, all this seems to suggest
that the instrumental variables have been well chosen and that the endogeneity
test reported in Table 3 is valid.
Before concluding this section it is useful to look at the rst stage regressions,
which, although in a reduced form, give an indication of the propensity of British
voters to be informed about politics (Table 5). First of all, the instruments are
signicant and show the expected signs. This suggests that mass media coverage
and the overall strategic importance of a constituency during an electoral campaign
make voters more informed. Thus, exposure to relevant information matters.
Among other exogenous variables, both education and income are very strong
predictors of political knowledge. This result is obtained in spite of controlling
for a number of covariates that are normally used to explain income. A number
of other socio-demographic and economic characteristics are also good predictors
of the voter political knowledge. Age, gender, the length of residence in a given
constituency and union membership all display sizeable and signicant e¤ects. In-
terestingly, the results show that the time constraint matters, as it a¤ects the
ability to gather information: while retired voters tend to be better informed than
average, the opposite is true for voters in full time occupation.
In contrast with what we found in the turnout equation, constituency-level
variables are good predictors of political knowledge: voters are substantially more
informed in constituencies with closer competitions. This is clearly compatible with
the fact that politicians and parties put more e¤ort in marginal constituencies (as
suggested for example in Aldrich, 1993, and Shachar and Nalebu¤, 1999). How-
ever, an alternative interpretation is possible: that individual demand for political
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information increases when the probability to be a pivotal voter is higher. A quite
surprising result is that political knowledge is higher in constituencies with more
unemployment.
Finally, political disposition variables have a large impact on political knowl-
edge: voters that declare to have a strong interest in politics are better informed.
The same is true of voters that pose themselves at extreme points on the left-right
scale. However, voters that show a strong attachment to a party tend to be less
informed. This stresses the importance of distinguishing between objective knowl-
edge and opinions, especially if one wants to derive normative statements about
the desirability of an informed public opinion and of a participative citizenry.
6 Concluding remarks
Does political knowledge a¤ect the propensity of citizens to vote? The conclusion
of this paper is that it does. Analysing data from the 1997 British general elec-
tion I nd not only that information is a good predictor of turnout, but also that
it raises voter participation in a clearly causal fashion. An increase equal to one
standard deviation from the mean in our measure of political knowledge raises the
probability that a person votes by at least 6% (with other variables kept constant
at their mean). A person with maximum knowledge is, other things equal, approx-
imately one third more likely to vote than a person at the bottom of the knowledge
distribution. This is a sizeable e¤ect.
I also derive results on the determinants of voterspolitical knowledge and show
that a number of socio-demographic variables with little direct impact on turnout
(like education and gender) can actually have a vast impact on it through their e¤ect
on political knowledge. This, together with the nding that income is an important
predictor of knowledge, implies that political representation is probably even more
socioeconomically biased of what previous studies of turnout could reveal. I also
show that political salience and the coverage given by mass media play a very
important role in increasing votersknowledge of political matters, in spite of their
negligible direct impact on turnout. This seems to suggest that the limited impact
of mass media on voting behaviour encountered in a number of studies could be
due to misspecication in the estimated equations.
Finally, I would like to conclude with some normative remarks on the link
between my results and the ndings of recent formal models of information aggre-
gation. The availability of information increases the turnout of informed voters in
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elections, thus making it more likely that the process of collective decision mak-
ing leads to desirable outcomes. Hence, although not included in formal deni-
tions of what democracy consists of, an informed public opinion and an accurate
transmission of information on the mass media improve the quality of democratic
governance.
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If not otherwise specied, variables are derived from the 1997 British General
Election Study.
 Information.
The variable Info has been constructed by using the following two questions:
1. Do you happen to remember the names of any candidates who stood in your
constituency in the general election this year?
Please write in all the names of candidates that you can remember (6 spaces
provided) or tick box: I cant remember any of the candidatesnames.
Note: the names of candidates written in by respondents were checked against
o¢ cial lists of candidates.
2. Political knowledge quiz (answers: true/false/dont know):
a: Margaret Thatcher was a Conservative Prime Minister;
b: The number of MP is about 100;
c: The longest time allowed between general elections is four years;
d: Britains electoral system is based on proportional representation;
e: MPs from di¤erent parties are on parliamentary committees;
f: Britain has separate elections for the European parliament and the British
parliament;
g: No-one may stand for parliament unless they pay a deposit.
Let us dene with names the number of candidates correctly reported and with
quiz the number of correct answers in question 2. Info is then given by
Info = names+ 0:66 quiz
Quiz has been downweighted because, being a true /false questions, it was
possible for respondents to guess the answer without knowing it. Using Bayes rule
we have (assuming the prior probability of a correct answer is 0.5):
Pr(knowjcorrect) = Pr(correctjknow)




 Turnout: Voters veried turnout. Reported turnout has been used for
respondents whose turnout has not been veried. These are approximately 15% of
the sample. Turnout = 1 means that the respondent voted.
 Income. Total household income from all sources before tax. Categorical
variable from 1 to 16.
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 Age. respondents age. Age2 is dened as the square of age divided by 100.
 Gender. Respondents gender, equal to 1 if male.
 Education. Respondents education level. Categorical variable from 1 to 7.
Married. Respondents marital status, equal to 1 if "married" or living as
married.
 Ethnicity dummies. To which of these groups do you consider you be-
long?. The variable asian is equal to 1 if the answer is one of Indian, Pakistani,
Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other Asian. The variable black is equal to 1 if the answer
is one of Black African, Black Caribbean, Other Black.
 Churchgoer. Categorical variable derived from the question: Apart from
such special occasions as weddings, funerals and baptisms and son on, how often
do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion?, with answers
going from "no religion or never or practically never attends" to "once a week or
more".
 Length of residence. Answer to:How long have you lived in this neigh-
bourhood?(in years).
 Full time job. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent works regularly
30 hours per week or more.
 house owner. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondents household
owns their accommodation.
 Canvasser. Dummy variable equal to 1 if a positive answer is given to Did
a canvasser from any party call at your home to talk to you during the electoral
campaign?and/or Were you contacted by anyone on the telephone during the
electoral campaign asking how you might vote?.
 Voted in 1992. Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent voted in the
1992 general election (self reported).
 Quality paper reader. Dummy variable equal to one 1 if the respondent
declares ro regularly read a daily morning newspaper and, to the question which
daily morning newspaper do you read most often?, answers one of the following:
The Daily Telegraph, The Financial Times; The Guardian; The Independent; The
Times.
 Retired. Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent declares to be
wholly retired from work.
 Union. Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent, or his/her partner,
is, or has been in the past, member of a union.
 Ideological strenght. Variable derived from the respondents ideological
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self-placement on a 0 (left) to 10 (right) scale. The ideological strenght is posed
equal to 0 if the position of the left-right dimension is 5, is equal to 1 if the position
on the left-right dimension is either 4 or 6, etc. Respondents who answered cant
choosehave an ideological strenght equal to 0.
 Party attachment. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent declares
to be very strongly attached to a party or if the respondent declares to have voted
always the same party.
 Degrees. Ratio of the population in the district with a degree (source:
Census 1991).but not higher education qualications.
 Unemployment. Ratio of unemployed population in the district (source:
Census 1991).
 Population density. Persons per hectare in the district (source: Census
1991).
Aggregate turnout. Percentage turnout in the constituency in 1997 election
(source: Boothroyd, 2002).
 Marginality. Dene with W and R the percentage of votes reported re-
spectively by the winning candidate and the runner up. Then Marginality =
(W  R)=(W +R) (source: Boothroyd, 2002).
 Bbc100. Dummy equal to 1 if the constituency was included among the 100
decisive constituencies ("the battleground") according to the BBC (source: BBC
web page).
 Big shot. Dummy equal to 1 if one of the candidates in the constituency is
a current or former member of cabinet, a current member of the shadow-cabinet
or the leader of the Liberal-Democratic party.
 Salience. Dummy variable equal to 1 a constituency is found to have been
"salient" on national newspapers during the last 30 days of the electoral campaign,
but not included in bigshot. The number of articles mentioning one of the can-
didates has been collected from three national newspapers (The Guardian, The
Independent and The Times). These have been weighted by the inverse of the
total political articles appeared in each newspaper durimng the same period and
then averaged. A constituency (in the sense of any of its candidates) is dened as
being salient if it has been mentioned in a number of articles which is above the
average (source: authors elaboration on data from the Guardian, the Independent
and The Times).
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wTab. 1 Self-reported and verified turnout
Verified 
Yes No Not Known Tot
Self-Rep. 
Yes 1952 109 300 2361
No 18 387 115 520
Don't Kno 0 1 0 1













Tab. 2: Probit Estimates of Turnout
Dependent variable: Turnout (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.006** -0.001
(0.72) (0.67) (0.48) (1.98) (0.20)
age2 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.0003
(0.89) (0.84) (0.64) (1.11) (0.10)
married 0.052** 0.052** 0.044** 0.058*** 0.042**
(2.55) (2.56) (2.12) (2.77) (2.08)
gender -0.021 -0.020 -0.022 -0.029 -0.024
(1.10) (1.05) (1.18) (1.48) (1.24)
asian 0.080 0.083 0.077 0.041 0.043
(1.32) (1.39) (1.36) (0.63) (0.72)
black -0.016 -0.007 -0.026 0.0002 -0.125
(0.16) (0.07) (0.25) (0.002) (0.92)
union member 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.021 0.010
(1.00) (0.99) (0.73) (1.12) (0.56)
length of residence 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001*
(1.80) (1.80) (1.89) (2.20) (1.73)
full time job -0.034 -0.035 -0.036 -0.022 -0.038*
(1.45) (1.50) (1.61) (0.94) (1.69)
house owner 0.031 0.030 0.034 0.045** 0.037**
(1.40) (1.36) (1.52) (2.05) (1.99)
quality newspaper reader 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.040 0.010
(1.57) (1.57) (1.62) (1.37) (0.31)
canvasser 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.058***
(3.39) (3.33) (3.40) (3.32) (3.04)
voted in 1992 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.273*** 0.209***
(10.23) (10.20) (10.39) (8.23)
aware of being registered 0.701*** 0.700*** 0.711*** 0.700*** 0.707***
(4.67) (4.63) (4.41) (4.2) (4.95)
marginality -0.081 -0.050 -0.042 -0.049 -0.038
(1.32) (0.76) (0.67) (0.81) (0.62)
degrees rate 0.045 0.027 0.155 0.207 0.179
(0.10) (0.06) (0.37) (0.50) (0.43)
unployment rate 0.147 0.333 0.435 0.240 0.241
(0.30) (0.65) (0.88) (0.50) (0.48)
population density 0.004 0.007 0.007 -0.002 0.009
(0.36) (0.66) (0.67) (0.18) (0.82)
aggregate turnout 0.427 0.473* 0.384
(1.53) (1.73) (1.45)






education 0.009 0.009 [0.20] [0.17] [0.53]
(1.64) (1.64)
income 0.003 0.003 [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]***
(1.21) (1.14)
church attendance 0.009** 0.009** [0.09]* [0.02]** [0.05]*
(2.40) (2.39)
Observations 2882 2882 2882 2882 2843
Pseudo-R2 0.1297 0.1310 0.1501 0.0950 0.1657
Observed P 0.7922 0.7922 0.7922 0.7922 0.7924
Predicted P (at the mean) 0.8180 0.8182 0.8238 0.8132 0.8282
The table reports marginal effects at the mean for continuos variables and the probability variation determined by a switch 
from 0 to 1 for dummy variables. All regressions include a constant and regional dummies.
Robust z-statistics in round brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
For categorical variables (education, income and churchgoer in columns 3-5) we report in square brackets the p-value 
of a Wald test and use the stars to indicate the joint significance of the coefficients.  
Tab. 3: Information and Turnout: probit estimates
Dependent variable: Turnout (1) (2) (3) (4)
information 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.114* 0.116*
(6.33) (4.71) (1.88) (1.95)
age -0.005 -0.003 -0.013** -0.011*
(1.54) (0.98) (1.96) (1.92)
age2 0.005 0.002 0.011** 0.009*
(1.47) (0.73) (1.99) (1.78)
married 0.044** 0.041** 0.043** 0.038*
(2.12) (2.04) (2.10) (1.87)
gender -0.044** -0.036* -0.088** -0.076**
(2.24) (1.86) (2.25) (2.42)
asian 0.088* 0.054 0.124** 0.100*
(1.65) (0.94) (2.14) (1.71)
black -0.029 -0.126 -0.033 -0.138
(0.28) (0.94) (0.31) (1.00)
union member 0.005 0.004 -0.014 -0.014
(0.26) (0.22) (0.61) (0.68)
length of residence 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(1.44) (1.27) (0.39) (0.10)
full time job -0.028 -0.030 -0.012 -0.011
(1.24) (1.37) (0.49) (0.44)
house owner 0.026 0.038* 0.011 0.021
(1.17) (1.72) (0.42) (0.84)
quality newspaper reader 0.020 -0.005 -0.036 -0.042
(0.66) (0.15) (0.64) (1.03)
canvasser 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.045** 0.038*
(3.13) (2.81) (2.00) (1.72)
voted in 1992 0.251*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.168***
(9.58) (7.82) (4.99) (5.89)
aware of being registered 0.718*** 0.710*** 0.709*** 0.706***
(4.17) (4.64) (4.06) (4.59)
marginality -0.006 -0.007 0.064 0.074
(0.09) (0.12) (0.79) (0.93)
degrees 0.058 0.121 -0.027 0.080
(0.14) (0.29) (0.06) (0.19)
unemployment rate 0.185 0.084 -0.225 -0.239
(0.37) (0.16) (0.39) (0.44)
population density 0.011 0.011 0.017 0.016
(1.04) (1.07) (1.48) (1.45)
aggregate turnout 0.428 0.360 0.323 0.262
(1.58) (1.37) (1.15) (0.97)
political interest 0.022** -0.016
(2.26) (0.62)
ideological self_placement 0.010* 0.000
(1.70) (0.03)
party attachment 0.129*** 0.138***
(6.86) (6.83)
first stage residuals -0.078 -0.088
(1.28) (1.30)
education [0.60] [0.63] [0.53] [0.47]
income [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]***
church attendance [0.12] [0.08] [0.24] [0.14]
Observations 2882 2843 2882 2843
Pseudo-R2 0.1688 0.1765 0.1696 0.2002
Observed P 0.7922 0.7924 0.7922 0.7924
Predicted P (at the mean) 0.8288 0.8309 0.8289 0.8386
The table reports marginal effects at the mean for continuos variables and the probability variation determined
by a switch from 0 to 1 for dummy variables. All regressions include a constant and regional dummies.
Robust z-statistics in round brackets. Standard errors for information and residuals in columns 3 and 4 have
been calculated by boostrap. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
For categorical variables (education, income and churchgoer) we report in square brackets the p-value of a
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Fig.2: Predicted voting probability as a function of information 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tab. 5: First stage regressions



















union member 0.253*** 0.220***
(3.60) (3.28)
length of residence 0.007*** 0.009***
(3.27) (4.43)
full time job -0.202** -0.223***
(2.44) (2.87)
house owner 0.199** 0.192**
(2.38) (2.40)




voted in 1992 0.483*** 0.264***
(5.24) (2.95)






unemployment rate 4.993*** 3.382*
(2.62) (1.87)
population density -0.079* -0.058
(1.90) (1.44)










church attendance [0.39] [0.31]
Observations 2882 2843
R-squared 0.3224 0.3886
All regressions include a constant and regional dummies. Robust z-statistics in round brackets.
.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
For categorical variables (education, income and churchgoer) we report in square brackets
 the p-value of a Wald test and use stars to indicate the joint significance of the coefficients. 
Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
turnout 2882 .7876475 .409044 0 1
information 2882 4.26118 1.833865 0 10.62
bbc100 2882 .129771 .3361096 0 1
salience 2882 .1065232 .3085597 0 1
bigshot 2882 .0725191 .2593905 0 1
age 2882 48.61659 17.65495 18 95
edu 2882 3.569396 2.16618 1 7
income 2882 6.989591 4.581465 1 16
married 2882 .5860514 .492625 0 1
gender 2882 .4656489 .4989052 0 1
asian 2882 .01839 .1343804 0 1
black 2882 .0090215 .0945686 0 1
church attendance 2882 1.975364 2.601047 0 7
union member 2882 .593338 .491296 0 1
length of residence 2882 19.75989 18.0382 0 94
full time job 2882 .7581541 .4282758 0 1
house owner 2882 .6776544 .4674556 0 1
retired 2882 .2338654 .423361 0 1
quality newspaper reader 2882 .1186676 .3234531 0 1
canvasser 2882 .2890354 .4533931 0 1
voted in 1992 2882 .7987509 .4010034 0 1
aware of registration 2882 .9944483 .0743155 0 1
party attachment 2882 .2366412 .4250939 0 1
interest in politics 2882 3.029146 1.053177 1 5
ideological strenght 2843 1.202603 1.524986 0 5
marginality 2882 .3032604 .1936666 .0051282 .8140044
aggregate turnout 2882 .7130278 .0511328 .514 .8
degrees 2882 .0603349 .0269313 .0149414 .1797613
unemployment 2882 .0929566 .0395296 .0286795 .2248957
population density 2882 1.344676 1.669413 .0021854 11.10492
